

7-7620

28 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

At the Deputies' Meeting on 28 December 1955 it was agreed that the information contained in the attached memo would be dispatched to field stations [redacted] [redacted] over the signature of the deputies concerned, with the provision that the deputies might make such changes as desirable without altering the meat of the message contained in this memo.

JSE:ekt (28 Dec 55)  
orig - Dep Mtg notes (ER file) ✓



STAT

Executive Assistant  
to the Director

~~RECIPIENTS~~: To be issued by DD/P, DD/I and DD/S to their respective overseas personnel

~~SUBJECT~~ : Security

This letter is prompted by a recent serious security breach at an overseas station. One of our senior officers checked out of a hotel and left his luggage and a brief case containing classified cables, dispatches, and other documents concerning a covert project in the custody of a hotel employee. When the officer returned two hours later, he found his luggage but the brief case was missing. Obviously, the classified papers should not have been in the brief case in the first place, but for the officer to allow the brief case out of his possession at all under the circumstances was an error in judgment which it is feared will have far-reaching effects as far as this particular project is concerned. Any time any KIRK  
personnel set in motion such <sup>o</sup> <sub>o</sub> chain of events which may be reasonably calculated to result in a security breach, it reflects a serious lack of judgment on their part.

Although it is recognized that as professional intelligence officers you are thoroughly conversant with sound security practices, it is felt necessary to reiterate strongly the necessity for constant vigilance in the physical handling of classified material, particularly when it is moved outside of the normal office area.

Therefore, please review the security practices presently in force at your station and have another thorough look at whether or not all personnel ~~under~~ your jurisdiction are following the regulations and sound procedures thoughtfully and conscientiously. Do not fail to go over all relevant precautions even though many may appear too elementary to warrant repetition.

**MEMORANDUM:** To be issued by DD/P, DD/I and DD/C to their respective overseas personnel

**SUBJECT :** Security

This letter is prompted by a recent serious security breach at an overseas station. One of our senior officers checked out of a hotel and left his luggage and a brief case containing classified cables, dispatches, and other documents concerning a covert project in the custody of a hotel employee. When the officer returned two hours later, he found his luggage but the brief case was missing. Obviously, the classified papers should not have been in the brief case in the first place, but for the officer to allow the brief case out of his possession at all under the circumstances was an error in judgment which it is feared will have far-reaching effects as far as this particular project is concerned. Any time any KUBARK personnel set in motion such <sup>0.5</sup> chain of events which may be reasonably calculated to result in a security breach, it reflects a serious lack of judgment on their part.

Although it is recognized that as professional intelligence officers you are thoroughly conversant with sound security practices, it is felt necessary to reiterate strongly the necessity for constant vigilance in the physical handling of classified material, particularly when it is moved outside of the normal office area.

Therefore, please review the security practices presently in force at your station and have another thorough look at whether or not all personnel under your jurisdiction are following the regulations and sound procedures thoughtfully and conscientiously. Do not fail to go over all relevant precautions even though many may appear too elementary to warrant repetition.

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SENDER WILL CHECK GLASS

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP *By HK*

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>Mr. J. Security</i>		<i>19 Dec</i>
2	<del>DDCI</del>		STAT
3	DD/S <i>Conc</i>		<i>19 Dec 55</i>
4	DDCI <i>Int. (D)</i>		
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

*Stuff*  
*Dick Helms has approved*  
*this draft. may we have your*  
*Conc. so that we can forward*  
*to DDCI for release*

*Conc.*

STAT

STAT

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
<i>Eo DDP</i>	<i>19 Dec</i>
	SECRET

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(Draft)

Book Dispatch No. \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Stations and Bases

SUBJECT: Security

[1. I have noted with increasing concern certain laxness in observing basic principles of security in the handling of classified documents.]<sup>2.</sup> Although I recognize that as professional intelligence officers you are thoroughly conversant with sound security practices, I feel that I must raise again the necessity for constant vigilance in the physical handling of classified material, particularly when it is moved outside of the normal office area.

1. [2.] This letter [was] prompted by my learning of a recent security breach at an overseas station. One of our senior officers checked out of a hotel and left his luggage and brief case containing classified cables, dispatches, and other documents concerning a [major] covert project in the custody of a hotel employee. When the officer returned two hours later, he found his luggage but the brief case was missing. Obviously, the classified papers should not have been in the brief case in the first place, but for the officer to allow the brief case out of his possession at all under the circumstances was an error in judgment which we fear may have far-reaching effects as far

as this particular project is concerned. *Obviously, too, this experienced officer should have known better than to set in motion such a chain of events.*

3. Please review the security practices presently in force at your

Station and have another look at whether or not all personnel under your

jurisdiction are following the regulations thoughtfully and conscientiously. *No*  
*not fail to go over all relevant precautions,*  
*even though many may appear to be elementary to*  
*warrant approval.*